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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the role of institutions, income inequality, cultural differences and health 
expenditures on cadaveric versus total kidney transplants scrutinizing information gathered from 63 countries over the 
period 1998-2002. We show that improvements in income equality and the rule of law encourage cadaveric kidney 
transplants in low-income countries. We find that cultural differences affect the number of cadaveric kidney 
transplants both in low- and high-income countries.
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1. Introduction 
Improvements in surgical technology and transplant immunology have led to long waiting 
lists for cadaveric and live kidneys since the latter part of the 1970s. Unfortunately, live 
kidney donors may not always be able to donate their organ to the intended patient because of 
blood-type and/or immunological incompatibilities. There is also an upper limit set on the 
number of cadaveric transplants by the number of brain-dead organ donors.1 Although, we 
can only keep the waiting list under control by increasing the use of cadaveric kidneys, it 
appears that there are a number of reasons why we cannot effectively increase cadaveric 
kidney donations.  
 
In this paper, we hypothesize that the rule of law, income inequality and cultural differences 
are some of the important factors that affect cadaveric versus live-kidney harvesting. We 
provide empirical support for our claims by using country-specific information on income 
inequality, the rule of law, cultural differences (proxied by religious beliefs), and live and 
cadaveric kidney transplants gathered from 63 countries over the period 1998-2002. In order 
to gauge the robustness of our findings and to guard against the potential misspecification of 
our model, we also introduce country-specific measures of medical expenditures in our 
analysis. 
 
We find that, in low-income countries, improvements in income equality and the rule of law 
in particular raise the cadaveric to total kidney transplant ratio while they do not have any 
impact in higher-income countries. We also find that cultural differences have an important 
impact on the cadaveric to total kidney transplant ratio both in low- and high-income 
countries. Private health expenditures also play a minor role both in low- and high-income 
countries. Interestingly GDP does not have any impact on the cadaveric to total kidney 
transplant ratio. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical paper to date that 
links health outcomes and cultural beliefs (see Anbarci and Caglayan, 2007, for a theoretical 
analysis of that link). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the background information 
and our hypothesis. Section 3 presents our data and empirical findings. Finally, Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2. Background: Institutions, Inequality and Cultural Beliefs 
There is no established and effective market system for human body parts other than the 
unregulated and informal system which is in place in some countries.2 In fact, prominent 
international groups such as the Council of Europe, the Transplantation Society, the World 
Health Organization, and the World Health Assembly regard the commoditization of body 
parts as “unacceptable.” Furthermore, the medical community worldwide is firmly against the 
purchase and sale of organs. However, although these principles set by these international 
organizations have made their way into national law, the purchase and sale of kidneys still 
persists. In some countries it is even legal.3  
                                                 
1 For example, in the U.S., the upper limit for cadaveric kidneys is around 14,000-15,000 (Sheehy et al., 2003). 
2 Roth, Sonmez and Unver (2005) suggest a centralized clearinghouse to facilitate kidney exchange.  Such 
clearinghouses are most needed in markets that are prone to various market failures.  
3 Kidney sales are legal in Iran and the Philippines kidney sales are legal. In Iran the brokers can induce the poor 
to donate their kidneys in return for amounts of cash as low as $1000. The Philippines allows residents to sell a 
kidney to a fellow countryman if no broker is involved (Jimenez and Bell, 2001). Evidence from Iran and the 
Philippines suggests that it is generally the poor who sell their kidneys. 
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The use of a live versus a cadaveric kidney depends on several factors. Elsewhere (see 
Anbarci and Caglayan, 2007), using a very simple, standard theoretical model we have 
highlighted the role that the rule of law, income inequality, and cultural differences play in 
the use of live versus cadaveric kidneys in transplants. Our results were as follows: 
1. As income inequality increases, more live kidneys will be used relative to the number 
of cadaveric kidneys used. 
2. As the extent of the rule of law increases or the fraction of people with anti-transplant 
cultural beliefs increases, fewer live kidneys will be used relative to the number 
cadaveric kidneys used. 
3. As per capita income increases, the number of live kidneys used relative to the 
number of cadaveric kidneys used may increase, decrease or remain the same; thus, 
per capita income has no consistent impact on that ratio. 
4. As the per capita income increases, the number of live kidneys used relative to the 
number of cadaveric kidneys used will depend less on the extent of the rule of law and 
income inequality. 
In Sections 2.1-2.3 we will elaborate on these different factors, and in Section 3 we will 
check the empirical validity of the results obtained by Anbarci and Caglayan (2007). 
 
2.1 Lack of Law Enforcement and Income Inequality 
Law enforcement in developing countries has been both weak and misplaced due to the 
presence of a large gulf between the laws that are in the statute books and their enforcement. 
For instance, Buscaglia and Stephan (2005) point out the gap between ‘law in the books’ and 
‘law in action’. They report evidence that the most unprotected segments of the population 
consider the main obstacles to access to justice to be the lack of legal information, economic 
factors, the fear of abuse of authority and corrupt practices. Bardhan (2005) indicates that 
there is a deficiency in each citizen’s expectations about others’ compliance of the law 
especially in most developing countries; while the presence of such expectations about 
others’ compliance forms the foundation of the rule of law, any deficiency in it points to a 
weak sense of the rule of law. 
 
In this sense, the stories originating from various countries describing the abuses to which 
farmers, the lower class, lower caste populations or prisoners are exposed in order to make 
them give up their kidneys or other body parts can be seen as a reflection of a lack of the rule 
of law. However, these stories also point out the presence of an income inequality in the 
society, as most organ sales in developing countries, whether open or covert, appear to 
involve voluntary sales of kidneys by poor farmers to wealthier urban residents. In other 
words, income inequality has a magnifying effect which is distinct from the key role of ‘lack 
of the rule of law’ in raising the commercial live-donor transplants in many developing 
countries.4 However, these issues are not relevant for developing countries alone. Existing 
                                                 
4 Income inequality plays different roles in magnifying certain problems in different contexts. In the context of 
earthquake fatalities, it causes the relatively wealthy to simply self-insure against the disaster while leaving the 
relatively poor at its mercy (Anbarci et al., 2005). In the context of traffic fatalities, either it allows the relatively 
wealthy to drive a motorized vehicle while the relatively poor to assume the role of pedestrians or it allows the 
relatively wealthy to drive a large, safe motorized vehicle while the relatively poor drive small, unsafe cars 
(Anbarci et al., 2009). Anbarci and Caglayan (2007) find that beyond some cut-off income inequality level, 
income inequality operates through the simplest channel: the very poor but healthy individuals can no longer 
resist the price that the very rich kidney patients would be able to afford to pay for the kidneys that these poor 
but healthy individuals possess. (While Anbarci et al. (2005, 2009) have both theoretical and empirical sections, 
our analysis here will only be empirical, since Anbarci and Caglayan (2007) have already provided the relevant 
but very standard theoretical analysis.)  
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loopholes in the laws of developed countries still permit illegal organizations to trade live 
human organs.5 Also, the life-and-death dilemma creates serious ethical and legal problems 
for medical staff. For instance many doctors admit that, before going ahead with a kidney 
transplantation, they cannot check the legality of every detail regarding a live-kidney 
transplantation arrangement between two people if the circumstances seem reasonable. 
 
2.2 Cultural Differences and Behavior 
Although there is little in the literature explaining why various health care systems in the 
world differ from each other, the literature on the importance of cultural differences in 
explaining individuals’ behaviors (or their perceptions of events) as well as a wide spectrum 
of economic outcomes may provide some clues in that regard. Various researchers, including 
Knack and Keefer (1995), Harrison and Huntington (2000), and Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2006) have suggested that the development and national economic performance of a country 
depend on her cultural make up, such as institutional arrangements and religious and political 
values, which can act as a barrier to the adoption of certain economic practices, institutions or 
technologies. Health care practitioners are also aware that a knowledge of cultural customs 
can help avoid misunderstanding and enable practitioners to provide better care (see Galanti, 
2000).  
 
Although it is not easy to discern behavioural patterns of individuals regarding organ 
donation, we choose to use religion as a proxy for cultural differences across nations.6  Our 
reason for this is the observation that in many countries, individuals’ shared beliefs, values, 
customs, and behaviors are strongly influenced by religion.  In particular, we want to 
determine whether there are any differences in terms of kidney donations between countries 
where the main religious belief is Christianity,7 Islam or an Eastern religion.8 Looking at the 
sample statistics (see Table 1), one can easily see that there are extreme differences between 
these groups in the use of cadaveric versus live kidneys.  Hence, the prima facia evidence 
supports the influence of cultural attitudes. 
 
3. Data and Empirics 
We extract data on cadaveric and live kidney transplants from the International Registry 
Organ Donation Transplantation database for 63 countries over the period 1998-2002.9 We 
split the data based on the countries’ main religious beliefs, as a proxy for cultural 
differences. The data include the following countries where Islam is the dominant religion: 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey. The data also include Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore as the sample for 
Eastern religions, while Christianity is the dominant religion for the remaining countries.10 
For each country, we obtain PPP adjusted GDP (calculated at 1995 prices in US dollars) data 
                                                 
5 For example, Kates (2002) reports the existence of an international transplant mafia that smuggles live donors 
into the US to sell their kidneys and livers. 
6 We should note that although there may be some religious precepts regarding the use of cadaveric kidney 
transplants, we mainly use religious beliefs as an indicator for capturing cultural differences. 
7 We avoid any finer classification of Christianity. 
8 Eastern religions include Buddhism, Shinto, Confucianism and Taoism which constitute the dominant religions 
in Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore. 
9 See www.tpm.org/registry/reg\_mondo.asp. 
10 Christian countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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from the World Development Indicators and population data from the US Census Bureau 
IBD database. Information on Income Inequality (Gini) is obtained from the World Income 
Inequality Database. Data on Rule of Law (ROL) are constructed by merging the indices 
provided by Knack and Keefer (1995) and Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005), which 
are accessible through the World Bank databases.  
 
Table 1 provides the basic statistical information for our data. Panel A displays the average 
number of live and cadaveric transplants for both the full sample and the two categories 
where we split the sample based on religion, as a proxy for cultural differences. When we 
look at the full sample statistics we see that the average number of live transplants is 
approximately 245, and that of cadaveric transplants is 494. If we were to concentrate on the 
countries, where the dominant religion is Islam, the annual average number of live transplants 
shoots up to 362 cases, while that of cadaveric kidney transplants drops to 57. If we look at 
the countries where the dominant religion is an Eastern religion, then the numbers are 140 
and 64 respectively. If we look at the remaining – i.e., Christian countries, cadaveric kidney 
transplants dominate those of live-transplants by 589 to 230 cases, on average. Although 
there are noticeable differences between Christian and Eastern-religion countries, the most 
striking difference is between Christian and Muslim countries: in Christian countries 
cadaveric-kidney transplants dominate live-kidney transplants in an order of more than 5-2, 
while in Muslim countries live-kidney transplants dominate cadaveric-kidney transplants in 
an order of more than 6-1. 
 
Panel B provides basic statistics on the average values for the Gini, Rule of Law and per 
capita GDP indices for the full sample and the two categories as before. The mean Gini index 
is 41 for the Eastern-religion countries, almost 41 for Muslim countries and almost 38 for 
Christian countries, indicating that income inequality is higher on average for the non-
Christian countries. We further show that the per capita GDP is lower and the Rule of Law is 
weaker in the Muslim countries than in the remaining countries (note that the per capita GDP 
is higher and the Rule of Law is stronger in Christian countries than in Muslim countries). 
 
 
3.1   Empirical Analysis 
In our analysis, because the per capita Gini and ROL indices do not vary much over time, we 
use 5-year averages of our variables to explore the impact of cultural differences, Rule of 
Law and Gini on the cadaveric to live kidney transplant ratio for low- and high-income 
countries. We expect to find that improvements in the rule of law and the state of income 
equality, particularly among the developing countries, would lead to a greater use of 
cadaveric kidney transplants. Hence, the associated coefficients should take positive and 
negative (an increase in the Gini coefficient implies an increase in income inequality) signs, 
respectively. We also expect to find a significant negative coefficient for the culture 
indicators which capture the differences across countries with respect to the use of cadaveric 
kidneys. The model we implement to test our claims takes the following form 
 
CR = α0 + α1Culture1 + α2Culture2 + γ1GDP + β1GiniLow + β2GiniHigh + η1 ROLLow + 
 η2ROLHigh + ε,  (1) 
 
where CR denotes the cadaveric to total kidney transplants ratio. Culture1 (Culture2) is a 
dummy which takes the value 1 for the Muslim (Eastern-religion) countries where the belief 
system differs from the Christian countries, as proxied by religious beliefs. A country is 
placed in the low-income group if her GDP per capita is below the 40th percentile for each 
 5
year; likewise, a country is placed in the high-income group if her per capita GDP is above 
the 40th percentile for each year – i.e., if it is in the 60th percentile. Hence, this split can allow 
us to see the impact of income inequality and the rule of law in relation to CR for low- and 
high-income countries.11 In all models, we report robust standard errors where we implement 
the Huber-White variance estimator in place of the traditional calculation. 
 
As was discussed earlier, we can see from column 1 of Table 2 that Gini and ROL play a 
significant role in the low-income countries: the Gini40 coefficient takes a negative sign and 
the ROL40 coefficient takes a positive sign. This implies that improvements in income 
equality and the rule of law would lead to an increase in the CR ratio. However, the same 
coefficients for high-income countries (Gini60 and ROL60) are insignificant. Interestingly, 
the coefficients of both culture dummies have a negative sign, and are significant at the 1% 
level, signalling a low level of cadaveric kidney harvesting in countries where the main 
religion is Islam or an Eastern religion, in contrast to those countries where Christianity is the 
main religion. This implies that cultural differences play a significant role in the use of live 
versus cadaveric kidneys. Finally, we see that GDP does not play any significant role in our 
model.12 
 
In order to gauge the robustness of the findings which we present in column 1, we augment 
the initial model using per capita data relating to public, private and total medical expenses, 
and present the corresponding results in columns 2-4 respectively. In column 5, we introduce 
per capita public and private medical expenses simultaneously. The results in columns 2-5 are 
similar to those in column 1 except for the private health expenditures in columns 3 and 5. In 
both of those columns, the level of spending on private health expenditures lowers the use of 
cadaveric kidneys versus live kidneys. This indicates that individuals with higher private 
health expenditures have even higher incentives to seek kidneys from live donors rather than 
waiting in line for a cadaveric kidney. 
 
Overall, these results confirm and support the results obtained by Anbarci and Caglayan 
(2007) that improvements in either income equality or in the rule of law could lead to a 
higher use of cadaveric kidney transplants in the context of low-income countries.13  
Furthermore, there is considerable evidence that cultural differences play a significant role in 
the use of live versus cadaveric kidneys. Private health expenditures play a minor role 
overall, while per capita GDP is not a factor in any group of countries. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Our findings, which are based on data from 63 countries over the period 1998-2002, not 
discounting potential policy changes, suggest that the ratio of cadaveric to total kidney 
transplants can be increased by implementing policies which improve the rule of law and 
income equality. We also provide evidence that cultural differences play an important role. In 
particular, when we proxy cultural differences using a religion dummy, we find that the use 
of cadaveric kidneys is low in societies where the main religion is Islam or an Eastern 
                                                 
11 The 40-60 split provides a sharper categorization between income groups than splitting the data using the 
mean GDP figures. The results for the mean split are similar to those we report here and are available from the 
authors upon request. 
12 Splitting incomes into low and high categories does not make any difference to the impact of per capita GDP 
on the use of live versus cadaveric kidneys. We have allowed GDP40 and GDP60 in the regressions but their 
coefficients were never significant. 
13 We also carry out a similar exercise computing 3-year averages. The results are similar to those we report 
here and are available from the authors upon request. 
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religion relative to societies where it is Christianity. This observation reflects the significance 
of cultural differences in determining the use of live versus cadaveric kidneys. Although there 
are papers that link health outcomes with income inequality (such as Anbarci et al., 2009), 
this is the first empirical paper to link health outcomes with cultural/religious differences. We 
believe that governments and health organizations should work in tandem and encourage 
people to use and donate cadaveric kidneys, as it may take decades to change the established 
cultural norms which are imbedded in the fabric of society.  
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Table 1: Basic descriptive statistics  
Panel A 
 Full Sample Muslim countries Eastern-religion 
countries 
Christian countries 
 Live 
Transp. 
Cadaveric 
Transp 
Live 
Transp. 
Cadaveric 
Transp. 
Live 
Transp. 
Cadaveric 
Transp. 
Live Transp Cadaveric 
Transp 
Average 245 494 362 57 140 64 230 589 
Std. dev 786 1238 508 50 238.95 40.68 840 1348 
Min 0 0 1 0 9 30 0 0 
Max 6178 8938 1585 189 633 151 6178 8938 
N 246 246 34 34 10 10 202 202 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B 
 Full Sample Muslim countries Eastern-religion 
countries 
Christian countries 
 Gini ROL  GDP  Gini ROL  GDP  Gini ROL  GDP  Gini ROL  GDP  
Average 38 4 15848 41 3 10011 40.81 5.07 22443 37.75 4.13 16513 
Std. dev 9 1 9784 4 1 5815 9.43 0.31 1456 9.37 1.12 10137 
Min 23 2 1143 31 2 1502 23.38 4.56 20316 24.9 1.59 1142 
Max 61 6 53385 47 4 20339 48.1 5.54 24109 61.4 5.83 53384 
N 237 253 243 21 34 34 10 10 10 206 209 199 
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Table 2.    Factors that affect cadaveric to live kidney transplant ratio 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
GDP 
-0.001 
[0.006] 
-0.002 
[0.007] 
0.002 
[0.005] 
-0.002 
[0.005] 
-0.002 
[0.005] 
Gini40 
 
-0.015 
[0.006]** 
-0.015 
[0.005]** 
-0.012 
[0.006]* 
-0.015 
[0.006]** 
-0.012 
[0.006]* 
Gini60 
 
-0.004 
[0.004] 
0.002 
[0.004] 
0.008 
[0.005]* 
0.004 
[0.003] 
0.008 
[0.005] 
ROL40 
 
0.198 
[0.079]** 
0.212 
[0.074]** 
0.220 
[0.080]** 
0.240 
[0.071]*** 
0.237 
[0.073]*** 
ROL60 
 
0.004 
[0.057] 
0.034 
[0.059] 
0.011 
[0.051] 
0.045 
[0.049] 
0.034 
[0.048] 
Public health 
expense 
- -0.095 
[0.025] 
- - -0.009 
[0.024] 
Private health 
expense 
- - -0.048 
[0.028]* 
- -0.048 
[-0.028]* 
Total health 
expense 
- - - -0.029 
[0.018] 
- 
Culture1  -0.472 
[0. 109]*** 
-0.490 
[0.128]*** 
-0.467 
[0.103]*** 
-0.520 
[0.119]*** 
-0.484 
[0.124]*** 
Culture2 -0.363 
[0.135] *** 
-0.512 
[0.098] *** 
-0.521 
[0.073]*** 
-0.569 
[0.063]*** 
-0.541 
[0.075]*** 
R-squared 0.62 0.60 0.54 0.62 0.54 
N 53 49 49 49 49 
Notes: All variables are 5 year averages of data covering 1998-2002. GDP and health expenses are in per capita. 
Gini and rol series are index series. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, **, *** respectively.  
Robust standard errors are given in brackets. 
 
